MULTIPLE INCORPORATION AS A FORM OF RAILROAD ORGANIZATION by unknown
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
intervention. Regulation by the government might remove duplication to
some extent, but since the milk business would still be operated with profit
as the dominant motive, it is questionable whether consumers would receive
any substantial benefits.
It is probable that duplication in facilities can be eliminated in fundamental
fashion only by some form of government ownership and operation of
milk distribution systems. Eminent domain proceedings financed by the
issuance of bonds might be instituted against private distributors. Admin-
istration could be placed in the hands of a Milk Distribution Authority,
composed of representatives of consumers, labor, social agencies, and milk
producers.7 2 While the suggested plans have generally contemplated owner-
ship by municipalities, 73 it may be desirable, though perhaps impracticable,
to adopt a system of state or federal ownership in order to attain effective
correlation and coordination of facilities.7 4 Government operation carries
with it, of course, a danger of political abuse, but at least, in contrast to the
present system, those in control of milk distribution would be known by
and accountable to the public. And the possibility of political machinations
seems worth risking in view of the substantial savings which government
ownership would undoubtedly effect.
MULTIPLE INCORPORATION AS A FORM OF
RAILROAD ORGANIZATION
THE IMPENDING announcement of a reorganization plan for the multiply-
incorporated New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad' suggests an
inquiry into the wisdom of retaining the multiple corporation as a form
of business organization. A multiple corporation is a business unit peculiar
to the American scene in which the same group of stockholders have become
incorporated in two or more states to carry out the same corporate purposes
milk plant, owned and managed by dairymen, is very feasible and, it is believed, would
solve most, if not all of the problems of economical and adequate supply."
72. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1937, p. 20, col. 4.
73. Ibid; BLAcx, op. cit. supra note 42, at 253-255.
74. Report on the More Economic Distribution and Delivery of Milk in the City
of Chicago, supra note 71, at 13-14.
1. The New Haven's president reported that the plan should be ready by Jtune 1.
See N. Y. Times, March 30, 1937, p. 31, col. 4. Another multiple corporation, the
Wabash Railroad, is also being reorganized. See N. Y. Times, April 8, 1937, p. 38,
col. 1.
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and have appointed one set of officers to run the entire organization.2 The
reasons for their appearance can best be explained by a glance at history.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Of primary significance in the development of this particular type of
business organization was the restrictive theory of corporations, that one
sovereign state may not grant privileges which will be exercisable in the
territory of another.3 This theory was formulated by legal scholars of the
early days in order to confine within narrow territorial limits the corpora.
tions which Congress or the state legislatures might erect, since the grants of
special and exclusive privileges or monopolies enjoyed by the great English
trading companies, with which the colonists were familiar, conflicted with
colonial ideas of natural rights.4 Although territorial limitations proved no
hardship to most of the early corporations which did no business outside
their charter states, the construction of canals, waterways, and interstate
bridges offered a field of activity in which the need of corporate institutions
transcending state lines was urgently felt. Since constitutional doctrines
founded upon comity, the commerce clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
unconstitutional conditions were not then sufficiently formulated to compel
the states to recognize foreign corporations,r some form of dual incorpora-
tion seemed to be the most practical solution to the problem; therefore,
instead of resorting to federal charters, corporations engaged in interstate
activities obtained concurrent grants of corporate powers.,
But railways, unlike waterways and bridges, were not built upon state
boundaries; and since the early roads were local in character,7 the necessity
for concurrent chartering in several states did not immediately appear.8
As the long haul demonstrated its usefulness, however, the small roads
began to extend their lines, and when a corporation desired to operate in
2. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 203.
3. For an exposition of this theory, see Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519
(U. S. 1839); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1869); YouNo, ForIc:; COM-
PANIES AND OTHER CORPORATIONS (1912) c. 2.
4. See 2 DAVIs, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF .A-,ERIC.N COnFOO.ATIOS
(1917) 6; HENDERSON, POSITION OF FOREIGN CoRPoRATIONs iN AE.ncAu CONSrrrU-
TIOxAL LAW (1918) c. 2.
5. See HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 4; Comment (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. Ray.
956, 1119.
6. In the period from 1781 to 1800, eleven corporations with two or more char-
ters were formed. Of these six were canal companies, four were bridge companies,
and one was the Bank of North America with a federal charter. See 2 DAvIS, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 30. For an example, see State v. Metz, 32 N. J. L. 199 (1867).
7. See M.ACGILL, HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION (1917) c. 17; STEVENS, THE BE-
GINNINGS OF THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD (1926) 200.
8. Concurrent incorporation of one railway by two states was used in a few
instances. E.g., Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 316 (136).
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foreign states, it would customarily obtain additional grants of corporate
powers 9 together with the necessary franchises.' 0 Multiple incorporation
could arise by this method without the consent or even despite the disap-
proval of the state first chartering, because the second state has the power
to reincorporate even if the corporation has no authority under its first
charter to accept a second" and because acceptance of a second charter does
not forfeit the first.12 But some criterion was needed to determine when the
second state had rechartered. During a period when it was uncertain whether
or not a foreign corporation might be served with legal process in other than
its charter state, the courts were not hesitant to consider all acts authorizing
foreign railway corporations to enter the state acts of incorporation so
that resident plaintiffs would not have to go into the foreign state to sue.13
But after it had become established that a foreign corporation might be
served in any state in which it was doing business, the Supreme Court
announced that reincorporation occurred only when the statute evidenced
a legislative intent to recharter.' 4
Although railroads often reincorporated voluntarily to facilitate the cross-
ing of state lines, voluntary reincorporation was not solely responsible for
the creation of multiple corporations in the railroad field. In many instances
this form of organization was compelled by state statutes which required
foreign corporations, as a condition of doing business in the state, to file
a copy of their charters and declared them to be domestic corporations. 1
These domestication statutes, as they have been called, were enacted pri-
marily to prevent the corporations from removing to the federal courts and
were the final step in the long though unsuccessful struggle which the states
have maintained to retain the exclusive jurisdiction of their own courts.16
9. See Nashua & Lowell R. R. v. Boston & L. R. R., 136 U. S. 356 (1890);
Brocket v. Ohio & P. R. R., 14 Pa. St. 241 (1850). But see Mead v. New York,
H. & N. R. R., 45 Conn. 199 (1877) (foreign corporation granted a franchise in Con-
necticut).
10. See 1 ELLIOTT, RAILROADS (3d ed. 1921) §§75, 76, 79.
11. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436 (1883).
12. Nashua & Lowell R. R. v. Boston & L. R. R., 136 U. S. 356 (1890); Com-
monwealth v. Pittsburg & C. R. R., 58 Pa. St. 26 (1868); see RESTATME.NT, CON-
FLICT OF LAws (1934) § 203.
13. County of Allegheny v. Cleveland & P. R. R., 51 Pa. St. 228 (1865); Balti-
more & 0. R. R. v. Gallahue's Administrator, 12 Gratt. 655 (Va. 1855). Authority
to convey assets or lease to a foreign corporation was even said to reincorporate the
foreign corporation which accepts the conveyance or lease. Angier v. East Tenn.,
V. & G. R. R., 74 Ga. 634 (1885); see Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 208,
227 (1876).
14. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65 (U. S. 1870).
15. E.g.. Miss. CODE Axx. (1930) § 4160-2; Tenn. Laws 1891, c. 122. Some
statutes do not declare that the corporation becomes reincorporated but merely state
that it shall be subject to state laws in the same manner as a domestic corporation.
E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 4127.
16. See generally, 17 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1931) § 8400.
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In most states these statutes applied only to certain classes of corporations
such as railroads and public utilities1 which were further attacked by state
constitutional provisions prohibiting all but domestic corporations from exer-
cising within the states special powers such as the power to buy or lease
railroads,' 8 to acquire real estate,' or to exercise the privilege of eminent
domain.20
The majority of the cases involving these statutes have been primarily
concerned with the states' power to affect access to the federal courts by
compulsory reincorporation. At first the state courts jealously tried to main-
tain their jurisdiction and, applying the test formulated by the Supreme
Court in the case of voluntary reincorporation, declared that there was no
diversity because the legislature had intended to recharter the foreign cor-
poration.2' For a time the lower federal courts were willing to accept this
view.22 But in those cases that reached the Supreme Court it was generally
held that, although the legislature might recharter, the particular statute
in question evidenced no such intent.2 3 All doubts on the subject, however.
vere dispelled by the case of St. Louis & San Francisco Railway z. Jawews?2
which announced a new rule, now establislied,2 that nothing short of the
incorporation of natural persons by a state will result in the creation of a
corporation whose stockholders will be presumed to be citizens of that state
for the purposes of federal jurisdiction.
17. E.g., N. C. Laws 1899, c. 62; Tenn. Laws 1877, c. 31.
18. E.g., S. C. CoxNsT. art. 9, § 8. When the legislature porovided a means by
which foreign corporations might become domesticated to fulfill the requirement, the
Act was held unconstitutional. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry. v. McCown, 84 S. C. 3W8. i'l S. F.
418 (1909). A later act whose constitutionality has apparently mt hcen ,,toed,
provides that the stockholders of the foreign railroad hut not the corporton itself
may apply for a domestic charter. S. C. Corz (1932) § 7777.
19. E.g., Ky. Co-sT. §211. Domestication is provided for by statute. Ky. STAT.
AN-xx. (Carroll, 1936) § 765.
20. E.g., NEB. Coxsr. art. x, § 8. Domestication is provided for by statute. NED.
Co-P. STAT. (1929) c. 24, § 222. Texas specifically prohibits all foreign corporations
from operating railroads in the state but provides no method for their domestication.
TEx. Axx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 6260.
21. State v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 25 Neb. 1EG, 41 X. W. 125 (183); Debnam
v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 126 N. C. 831, 36 S. E. 269 (1960); Allison v. Southern
Ry., 129 N. C. 336, 40 S. E. 91 (1901) ; Mathis v. Southern Ry., 53 S. C. 246, 31 S. -E.
240 (1893).
2. Upphoff v. Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R. R., 5 Fed. 545 (C. C. D. Ky., 1820);
Stout v. Sioux City & Pac. R. R., 8 Fed. 794 (C. C. D. Xeb. 1831); Misscuri Pac. Ry.
v. Meeh. 69 Fed. 753 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895).
23. Pennsylvania R. R. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. P. R., 118 U. S. 293 (1836);
Goodlett v. Louisville & N. R. R.. 122 U. S. 391 (1887); Martins Administrator v.
Baltimore & 0. R.. P, 151 U. S. 673 (1894). Coatra: .Memphis & C. R. R. v. Ala-
bama. 107 U. S. 581 (18-2).
24. 161 U. S. 545 (1896).
25. Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552 (1899);
Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326 (1903): Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U. S.
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Some of the cases suggest a distinction between the states' power to
domesticate to prevent resort to the federal courts and the power to
domesticate for other purposes without enumerating the purposes for
which domestication is permissible.20  Furthermore, the Supreme Court,
in the few decisions that have not involved a question of federal jurisdiction,
has held that the state legislature might reincorporate foreign corporations
in order to tax them and to confer powers not contained in their original
charters.2 7 But a recent Wisconsin decision suggests a situation in which
domestication statutes are ineffective to accomplish their purpose by holding
that a state may not defeat the Supreme Court's rule against double taxation
by the simple expedient of reincorporation. 28 In view of this decision it
may be necessary to qualify the broad statement, recently affirmed by the
Supreme Court, that a state may always require reincorporation as a con-
dition of doing intrastate business within its boundaries. 29
Since compulsory domestication does not create a multiple corporation
for all purposes, and since state requirements that certain powers may be
exercised only by domestic corporations would probably be met today by
the subsidiary device, it seems unlikely that true multiple corporations will
in the future be organized by rechartering unless the action on the part
of the management is voluntary. But even this possibility is slight since
state constitutional prohibitions bar special acts of incorporation.
The main reason for most of the existing multiple corporations was the com-
bination of two railroads incorporated by different states whose lines hap-
pened to connect. Since the early railroad charters contained no provisions
for the sale of assets and franchises, 30 and since the potentialities of control
through stock ownership had not as yet been realized, statutory consolidation
was the method of combination generally used, even though special legislative
541 (1912); Carolina & N. W. R. R. v. Clover, 34 F. (2d) 480 (W. D. S. C. 1929);
see Comments (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1106, (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 538.
26. See cases cited supra note 25.
27. Indianapolis & S. L. R. R. v. Vance, 96 U. S. 450 (1878); Clark v. Barnard,
108 U. S. 436 (1883) ; see Smith v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 96 Fed. 504, 506 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1899). Some state decisions are in accord. Ewing v. Warren, 144 Miss. 233,
109 So. 601 (1926); Commonwealth v. United Cigarette Machine Co., 119 Va. 447,
89 S. E. 935 (1916).
28. Newport Co. v. Wis. Tax Commission, 219 Wis. 293, 261 N. W. 884 (1935),
(1936) 11 Wis. L. REv. 300; see Frost, Power of the States to Donmesticate Foreign
Corporations for Income Tax Purposes (1925) 59 Am. L. REv. 1; Comment (1931)
44 HARv. L. RE%. 1111. Contra: Commonwealth v. United Cigarette Machine Co.,
119 Va. 447, 89 S. E. 935 (1916).
29. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 (1931), 40 YALE L. J.
1103.
30. Unlike other corporations, prosperous railroads cannot sell their assets and
franchises in the absence of legislative authorization. See 1 ELiorr, RAILROADS (3d
ed. 1921) §§82, 595.
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authorization was required.31 As the early railroads had no complicated
capital structures but were financed almost entirely by the issue of common
stock, the consolidation device allowed combination to take place by the
simple expedient of calling the stockholders of each corporation stockholders
in the other.32 These early consolidations were probably little more than
contracts for the joint operation of two existing lines, and since most of
the early charter authorizations merely conferred the power "to connect
and make joint stock" with other railroads, it was natural for the courts
to say that the consolidation did not affect the separate corporate entities
in each state33 But even though the consolidation statutes became more
general and were phrased so as to imply the creation of a single corporation,
the courts continued to hold that two corporate entities must result when
the organization is effected under the statutes of two states.34
Many railroads that became multiple corporations by interstate consolida-
tion have continued to retain that form of corporate organization. 3 In addi-
tion, further consolidations may be achieved under the laws of some states
only through the device of multiple incorporation, for several states have
not yet granted domestic corporations authority to convey their assets and
franchises to foreign corporations.3 But a few courts have evidenced a
disinclination to hold that interstate consolidations result in multiple incor-
poration and have called the combination either a merger as distinguished
from a consolidation,37 or a sale of assets and dissolution of one company,38
or have said that the intent of the parties to create one corporation shall
control,39 or that the consolidated corporation was created under foreign law
alone.40 Furthermore, the most recent statutes avoid multiple incorporation
31. Pearce v. Madison & I. R. R., 21 How. 441 (U. S. 1859); see 1 ELuorr, RA7L-
ROADS (1921) § 370.
32. E.g., Mass. Laws 1840, c. 50, § 1. See Farnum v. Blackstone Canal Corp.,
8 Fed. Cas. No. 4675, at 1062 (C. C. IL I. 1830); Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 239,
296 (1859).
33. Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319 (1877); Bishop v. Brainerd, 23 Conn. 2Z9 (1859).
34. Southern Ry. v. Lancaster, 149 Ga. 434, 100 S. E. 30 (1919); Ohio & M. Ry.
v. People, 123 Ill. 467, 14 N. E. 874 (18H8).
35. E.g., Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry.; Gulf, Mobile & Northern i. R.; New York
Central R. R.; and New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R.
36. E.g., Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, and Texas. In some states this privi-
lege is given only in certain circumstances, as when the foreign corporation owns all
the stock of or leases the domestic railroad corporation. E.g., ILL. REv. STT. (1935)
c. 114, § 37 (1); IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 55-2513.
37. Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 150 Fed. 775 (C. C. S. C. 1906), aff'd Sub
noin., Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Dunning, 166 Fed. 850 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903); Royal
Palm Soap Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 296 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
38. Walters v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. P., 104 Fed. 377 (C. C. Neb. 190D).
39. Eaton & H. R. R. v. Hunt, 20 Ind. 457 (1863). But ef. Wasley v. Chicago,
. I. & P. Ry., 147 Fed. 608 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1906).
40. Westheider v. Wabash R. R., 115 Fed. 840 (C. C. S. D. II. 1902). But cf.
Patch v. Wabash R. Ri, 207 U. S. 277 (1907); Paul v. Baltimore & 0. & C. R. .,
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by allowing the consolidated company to choose the state under whose laws
it will organize from among the charter states of its constituents. 41 But the
majority of the states still have no such provision, and a few, perhaps fearing
that they will lose control of the consolidation if it becomes a foreign cor-
poration, require that it remain a domestic corporation.
42
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MULTIPLE CORPORATIONS
Once multiple incorporation has occurred it is important to determine
the status of the organization in each charter state. To the business man
there is but one corporation chartered in several states. But the traditional
legal view is otherwise: A separate legal entity is said to result in each
charter state, first, because the Constitution prohibits two or more states
from making compacts without the consent of Congress;43 secondly, be-
cause, in spite of the full faith and credit clause, notions of sovereignty
prevent the laws of one state from having extraterritorial effect; 4  and
finally, because the restrictive theory requires corporations to dwell in the
state of their origin. -Consequently a multiple corporation is said to be
subject to all the privileges and obligations imposed upon domestic cor-
porations in each charter state.45 But such corporations are not entitled
to exercise in one charter state privileges granted in another ; 4 and in some
instance they have escaped obligations imposed by charter states by con-
vincing the courts that they were not corporations organized under the
laws of the state within the meaning of the regulatory statute.4 Because of
the fact that a multiple corporation is considered a domestic corporation in
each charter state, many unusual legal problems have arisen.
Federal Jurisdiction. The most prolific source of litigation involving mul-
tiple corporations has been the question of federal jurisdiction based upon
44 Fed. 513 (C. C. Ind. 1890) ; Winn v. Wabash R. R., 118 Fed. 55 (C. C. W. D. Mo.
1902).
41. E.g.. Del. Laws 1935, c. 148, § 6; N. Y. RAILIOAD LAW § 140; UNIFoRMr Bus.
CORP. Acr § 43.
42. E.g., IDAHO COxST. Art. xi, § 14; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 56, § 63; VA. CODE
(Michie, 1930) §§3821, 3857. Texas prohibits all domestic railroad corporations from
consolidating with foreign corporations. TEX. COxST. art. 10, § 6.
43. U. S. COxST. Art. I, § 10 (3). Ohi6 & Miss. Ry. v. People, 123 I1. 467, 14
N. E. 874 (1888). But see Brockett v. Ohio & Pa. R. R., 14 Pa. 241, 244 (1850).
44. Ohio & Miss. R. R. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286 (U.S. 1862); Quincy R. R.
Bridge Co. v. Adams Co., 88 Ill. 615 (1878) ; Chicago & N. W. R. R. v. Auditor Gen-
eral, 53 -Mich. 79, 18 N.W. 586 (1884).
45. Peik v. Chicago & N. V. Ry., 94 U. S. 164 (1877); Stone v. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307 (1886); Wells Lumber Co. v. Menominee River Boom
Co., 203 Mich. 14, 168 N. W. 1011 (1918) ; Sage v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 70 N. Y.
220 (1877).
46. Peik v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 94 U. S. 164 (1877).
47. Ohio & Miss. Ry. v. People, 123 I1. 467, 14 N. E. 874 (1888). Compare the
cases permitting stockholders' meetings to be held in only one state, cited infra note 72.
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diversity of citizenship. A few well defined rules have emerged. When
suit is brought against a multiple corporation in any charter state, federal
jurisdiction will often depend on which entity is sued. The federal courts
have resolved this problem by a conclusive presumption that the multiple
corporation is domiciled in the charter state in which suit is brought, so
that the requisite diversity will exist only if the plaintiff is a citizen of
some other state, citizenship in another charter state sufficing for this
purpose.48 When the multiple corporation is a party plaintiff, some courts
have held that it may clothe itself with the name and citizenship of any of
its numerous entities no matter where it brings suit. 9 But in a recent case
where a railroad incorporated in North Carolina and Virginia sued a North
Carolina corporation, federal jurisdiction was denied on the ground that
a multiple corporation should be presumed to be a citizen of the charter
state in which suit is brought when it is suing as well as when it is sued.50
If the distinction between suits against and suits by multiple corporations is
thus abandoned, it will be practically impossible for a multiple corporation
to sue a citizen of any charter state in the federal courts, for realistic con-
siderations usually necessitate suit in the state of which the defendant is a
citizen.
Taxation. Aultiple corporations afford greater opportunity for double
taxation than ordinary corporations, but the courts, under the guise of
statutory construction, have exhibited a reluctance to impose this burden,
since it places multiple corporations at a competitive disadvantage with other
business units. One potential cause of double taxation is the exaction of
organization taxes by several states. When a multiple corporation is formed
by the consolidation of corporations of two states, each state has the power
to impose an organization tax upon the full amount of the capital stock,
since each state is granting to the consolidated corporation the privilege of
incorporating.51 Some courts, however, are willing to construe the taxing
statutes so as to avoid this result. Thus, statutes imposing a tax on cor-
porations "organized under the laws of this state" have been interpreted to
48. Railway Company v. Whitton's Administrator, 13 Wall. 270 (U. S. 1871);
Patch v. Wabash R. R., 207 U. S. 277 (1907); 'Missouri Pacific Ry. v. .Meeh. 69 Fed.
753 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Lake Shore & Mk. S. Ry. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944 (C. C. A. 6th,
1909); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 44 F. (2d) 595 (Md. 1930); Bos-
ton & M%. R. R. v. Breslin, So F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935).
49. Nashua & L. R. R. v. Boston & L. R. R., 136 U. S. 356 (1890); Chicago &
N. W . Ry. v. Chicago & P. R. R., 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2665 (C. C. X. D. II1. 1874); see Wis.-
LiAms, op. cit. supra note 48, at 169; cf. Carolina & N. W. Ry. v. Town of Clover, 34 F.
(2d) 480 (VNr. D. S. C. 1929). For the rule that a multiple corporation may not sue
as a corporation chartered in two states, see Ohio & 'Miss. R. IL v. Wheeler, 1 Black
286, 297 (U. S. 1862) ; St. Joseph & G. I. R. R. v. Steele, 167 U. S. 659, 6-63 (1897).
50. Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 81 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 4th,
1936).
51. Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436 (1894); Ohio & Miss. M. R. v. Weber, 95 Ill.
443 (1880); Chicago & E. I. R. R. v. Ketcham, 153 Ind. 134, 51 N. E. 924 (1899).
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mean organized under the laws of that state alone.12 Likewise, when cor-
porations have been rechartered in the taxing state, the courts have generally
held that the tax did not apply, either because the particular domestication
statute did not create a new corporation,53 or because the tax applied only
to corporations chartered there for the first time.
54
Double taxation might also result from the imposition of annual franchise
taxes by each charter state, measured by the total capital stock of a multi-
ple corporation for the privilege of doing business in the corporate form.5
But many franchise taxes, especially those levied upon railroads, are by
statute measured only by capital used or property owned in the state,66 and
several state courts have arrived at the same limitation without the aid of
statutes by calling the tax one upon property which is valid only on the
property within the state.57
Taxation of the income and the intangible property of multiple corpora-
tions raises peculiarly difficult problems because of the general rule that the
state of a corporation's domicile has power to levy such taxes. If this rule
is applied to multiple corporations, and if they are considered to be domi-
ciled in each charter state, as they are for the purpose of federal jurisdiction,
each of these states might levy a tax on all intangible property and income
belonging to the corporation. But in view of the Supreme Court's recently
assumed antipathy toward double taxation, 8 this rule may not be carried
to its logical extreme. One alternative would be to consider a multiple cor-
poration as having only one domicile-perhaps the state of its principal
office-for purposes of taxation. Or the multiple corporation might be recog-
nized as several entities having separate domiciles; each entity would then
be taxed on all income derived from business transacted in its own charter
52. People v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 129 N. Y. 474, 29 N. E. 959 (1892) ;
New York Central R. R. v. Flynn, 233 App. Div. 123, 251 N. Y. Supp. 343 (3d Dep't
1931).
53. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 196, 83 S. W. 562
(1904).
54. Vaughan v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 192 Ky. 137, 232 S. W. 411 (1921);
State v. Tompkins, 43 S. C. 49, 25 S. E. 982 (1896).
55. Indianapolis & St. L. R. R. v. Vance, 96 U. S. 450 (1878) ; Keokuk & Hamilton
Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626 (1900) ; Kansas City, M. & B. R. R. v. Stiles,
242 U. S. 111 (1916) ; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 202 Ala. 558, 81 So. 60 (1918),
cert. denied, 253 U. S. 489 (1920). The issue of double taxation did not arise in these
cases. See Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of It? (1935) 48
HARv. L. REv. 407, 414.
56. See 2 CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) §§ 815, 817.
57. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Auditor General, 53 Mich. 79, 18 N. W. 586 (1884);
Easton Delaware Bridge Co. v. Metz, 32 N. J. L. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1867); Commonwealth
v. President, Manager & Company, 9 A.%. L. REG. 298 (Pa. C. P. 1860); see State
Treasurer v. Auditor General, 48 Mich. 224, 231, 9 N. W. 258, 260 (1881).
58. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); see HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND
INCOmE (1933) ; Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word (1933) 44 YALE L. J. 582.
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state and on all the intangibles which could be given a situs there; while
as to income and intangibles attributable to non-charter states and intangibles
for which no situs could be found, each entity might be taxed for a share
computed by dividing the total among all the entities either equally or ac-
cording to the respective contributions of each entity to the total volume
of business.
Multiple corporations have been concerned with the danger that each
charter state might levy a succession or transfer tax upon all outstanding
shares of stock, for such taxes would tend to raise the cost of obtaining
capital by rendering the corporation's shares a less desirable investment.59
In view, however, of the recent Supreme Court holding in First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine,"° that the shares of a corporation owned by a
nonresident decedent are not taxable by the state of incorporation, the power
of two charter states to levy a succession tax on the same shares would no
longer seem to exist. But the possibility still remains that each charter state
might levy a transfer tax on the shares of multiple corporations.0 '
Responsibility for Acts of Multiple Corporations. It seems clear that acts
done on behalf of multiple corporations bind all entities. Thus, a multiple
corporation is subject to garnishment in one charter state for wages due
for work done in another0 2 and may be sued in one charter state on tort
or contract claims or judgments incurred in another.03 Furthermore, a court
in a charter state which has acquired jurisdiction over such a corporation
may order the sale of all corporate property at foreclosure even though part
is situated in other charter states."
59. The power of one charter state to levy a succession tax has been upheld on
several occasions. Northern Central Ry. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 152 Md. 94, 136 AtI. 66
(1927); Welch v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 223 Mass. 87, 111 N. E. 774 (1916).
But cf. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926).
60. 284 U. S. 312 (1932). But see Brown, supra note 55, at 414.
61. See First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 330 (1932);
Lowndes, The Passing of Sius-iursdiction to Tax Shares of Corporate Stoch (1932)
45 HARV. L. Rzv. 777, 786.
62. Johnson v. Union Pacific R. R., 145 Fed. 249 (C. C. R. I. 1905); Georgia & A.
Ry. v. Stollenwerck, 122 Ala. 539, 25 So. 258 (1899). But see Tourville v. Wabash
R. R., 148 Mo. 614, 622, 50 S. AN. 300, 301 (1899).
63. Smith v. New York, N. H. & H. R. r1, 96 Fed. 504 (C. C. Mass. 1899) (tort);
Boston & Maine R. R. v. Breslin, 80 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), cert. dcni cd,
297 U. S. 715 (1936) (tort); Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 45 Fed. 812 (C. C. Neb.
1891) (contract); Riverdale Cotton Mills v. Alabama & Georgia Mfg. Co., 193 U. S.
188 (1905) (judgment).
64. Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444 (1876); Blackburn v. Selma, M. & 211. R. R.,
3 Fed. Cas. No. 1467 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1879). Compare State v. Northern Central
Ry., 18 Md. 193 (1861) (courts of one charter state may appoint receiver for entire
road), with Matter of Cooley, 186 N. Y. 220, 229, 78 N. F. 939, 941 (1995) (prop-
erty in each charter state must be administered by receiver appointed by courts of
that state).
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But the courts have been uncertain in selecting the theory on which this
result may be reached. Instead of considering all the entities joint opera-
tors of the whole enterprise, they have attacked the problem with presump-
tions, as in the cases involving federal jurisdiction. The traditional pre-
sumption is that the entity created by one charter state is the one performing
all acts in that state."a Resort is then had to principles of agency, joint
adventure, or partnership to bind all the other entities.6  A few courts,
however, have been unable to find any theory by which to bind one entity
for acts done by the otherG7 The modern view cures this deficiency by a
presumption that the corporation created by the forum state owns and oper-
ates the properties in all the states, charter and non-charter, thus ignoring
the other entities completely. 8
Stockholders' Meetings. Since ordinary corporations may not hold stock-
holders' meetings outside the charter state either for organization 0 or any
other purpose 70 without express statutory authorization, it has been argued
that no valid obligation, in the case of a multiple corporation, is created
unless authorized by successive meetings in each charter state. But the courts
have unanimously repudiated this contention. holding that a meeting in any
charter state for organization 7 1 or any other purpose 72 may create obliga-
tions binding in every charter state. The question of what law should govern
the method of calling the meeting has, however, remained unsettled, and in
65. Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444 (1876); Memphis & C. R. R. v. Alabama, 107
U. S. 581 (1882); Patch v. Wabash R. R., 277 U. S. 227 (1907); Stout v. Sioux City
& P. R. R., 8 Fed. 794 (C. C. D. Neb. 1881); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753
(C. C. A. 8th, 1895).
66. In re Boston, H. & E. R. R., 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1677 (C. C. D. Conn. 1871);
Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 45 Fed. 812 (C. C. D. Neb. 1891); Smith v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. R., 96 Fed. 504 (C. C. D. Mass. 1899); Newport & Cincinnati
Bridge Co. v. Woolley, 78 Ky. 523 (1880).
67. Kahl v. Memphis & C. R. R., 95 Ala. 337, 10 So. 661 (1891); see Tourville
v. Wabash R. R., 148 Mo. 614, 622, 50 S. W. 300, 301 (1899).
68. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); Case v.
Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry., 225 Fed. 862 (W. D. S. C. 1915); Boston & M. R. R. v. Bres-
lin, 80 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 715 (1936).
69. Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 19 So. 172 (1896).
70. American Clearing Co. v. Walkill Stock Farms Co., 293 Fed. 58 (S. D. Fla.
1923); Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co., 106 Ill. 439 (1883).
71. Winn v. Wabash R. R., 118 Fed. 55 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1902). Where multiple
incorporation occurs by rechartering, no organization meeting is necessary to accept
the new charter. Western & A. R. R. v. Roberson, 61 Fed. 592 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894) ;
see Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry., 75 Fed. 433, 443 (C. C. A. 6th,
1896).
72. Graham v. Boston, H. & E. R. R., 118 U. S. 161 (1886); Brown v. Boston &
M. R. R., 233 Mass. 502, 124 N. E. 322 (1919); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co.
v. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317 (1877) ; see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 204;
Foley, Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation and the Conflict of Laws (1929) 42 HAR.
L. REv. 516, 524.
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view of the dearth of authority on the subject,7 3 it would seem advisable
to satisfy the requirements of every charter state. But once the meeting
is assembled, its conduct is guided by the law of the charter state in which
it is held.74
Ultra vires. The difficulties of multiple corporations concerning the doc-
trine of ultra vires, are caused by the fact that the powers conferred on
these corporations are frequently broader under one charter than under
another.7 5 Where the issue of ultra vires is raised before the contemplated
action is carried out the applicable legal doctrine is relatively simple: If the
act will affect the corporation in only one charter state, it need be authorized
by that state alone.76 But if the proposed act will affect the corporation as
a whole and is not authorized under each charter, it will generally be en-
joined at the suit of a stockholder 77 or of the attorney-general 78 in any
charter state. One court, however, has said that acts authorized under one
charter are authorized under all.79 The problem is likely to become acute
in financing operations which usually affect the whole line. Thus, a railroad
incorporated in six states, which wished to issue convertible bonds was
forced to induce the legislatures of all six states to amend their corporation
laws in order to secure the requisite power under the charter of each state.80
When action not authorized in every charter state has actually been car-
ried out, other rules govern. If suit is brought in a state in which the act
73. What little authority there is suggests that the method of calling the meeting
is governed by the law of the charter state in which the meeting is to be held. See
Pollitz v. Wabash R. R., 150 App. Div. 709, 712, 135 N. Y. Supp. 7'5, 787 (1st Dep't
1912) ; RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 204.
74. Brown v. Boston & Maine R. R., 233 Mass. 502, 124 N. E. 322 (1919); see
RESTATEmET, CoNFcr OF LAws (1934) § 204; Foley, supra note 72, at 525.
75. Cf. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552 (1893);
Mackay v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 82 Conn. 73, 72 Ati. 533 (1909); Attorney
General v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 198 Mass. 413, 84 N. E. 737 (1903).
76. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436 (1883) ; Attorney General v. Boston & Maine
L R., 109 Mass. 99 (1871); see Attorney General v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R.,
198 Mass. 413, 84 N. E. 737 (1908) ; Boston & Maine R. R., 3 Op. At. Gen. 199, 205
(Mass. 1909).
77. Bulkeley v. New York, N. H. & H. R. RL, 216 Mass. 432, 103 N. E. 1033
(1914); Pollitz v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 96 Oh. St. 49, 117 N. E. 149 (1917);
see Continental Securities Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 217 N. Y. 119, 126, 111
N. E. 484, 486 (1916).
78. Ohio & 'Miss. Ry. v. People, 123 Ill. 467, 14 N. E. 874 (1888); Attorney Gen-
eral v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 198 'Mass. 413, 84 N. F. 737 (1903).
79. See Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317, 325 (1877).
When an association already incorporated by one state is reincorporated by another,
there is some authority holding that the creation of shares is governed by the law
of the state which first incorporated the association. Grangers' Life & Hcalth Ins.
Co. v. Kamper, 73 Ala. 325 (1882); Covington v. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co.,
10 Bush. 69 (Ky. 1873); RZsTATESIENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 205; Foley, supra
note 72, at 541.
80. This was the experience of the New York Central Railroad in 1934.
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is intra vires, the act will be held to have created a valid obligation on the
entire property,8' even though the judgment may not be recognized in charter
states where the act is ultra vires.8 2 But if suit is brought in a state in
which the act is ultra vires the courts have been almost as anxious to apply
local law and have ignored the fact that it might be intra vires under the
laws of some other charter state.8 3 In determining the issue of ultra vircs,
however, the courts appear reluctant to hold the act unauthorized in the
absence of specific statutory prohibitions,8 4 and even these have been held
inapplicable on the ground that the legislature impliedly consented that
they should not apply to multiple corporations.8 5 Where suit is brought in
a non-charter state, there is no conflict between local and foreign law, and
as might be expected, the results are more equitable. In this situation, the
courts have enjoined threatened action that was not intra vircs under all
charters,80 but have called the executed acts intra vires if they were author-
ized by any charter state.87
CONCLUSION
From a survey of these problems it would seem that the disadvantages,
of doing business as a multiple corporation outweigh the advantages -a
view substantiated by the fact that multiple corporations are practically non-
existent save in the railroad field.88 It by no means follows, however, that
81. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436 (1883); Mackay v. New York, N. H. & H.
R. R., 82 Conn. 73, 72 Atl. 583 (1909).
82. Alabama & -Georgia Mfg. Co. v. Riverdale Cotton Mills, 127 Fed. 497 (C. C. A.
5th, 1904) ; Pittsburgh & S. L. R. R.'s Appeal, 4 At. 385 (Pa. 1886). Contra: River-
dale Cotton Mills v. Alabama & Georgia Mfg. Co., 198 U. S. 188 (1905).
83. Farnum v. Blackstone Canal Corp., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4,675 (C. C. R. I. 1830);
Attorney General v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 198 Mass. 413, 84 N. E. 737 (1908);
Blue Ridge Power Co. v. Southern Ry., 122 S. C. 222, 115 S. E. 306 (1922). Where
suit is brought in a federal court by reason of diversity of citizenship, the court has
refused to consider that the act was intra zqres in another charter state, for this would
have the effect of bringing the corporation of another state before the court and would
often defeat diversity jurisdiction. Pennsylvania R. R. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R.,
118 U. S. 290 (1886); cf. Alabama & Georgia Mfg. Co. v. Riverdale Cotton Mills,
127 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 5th, 1904).
84. Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. R., 86 Fed. 929 (C. C. N. D.
Ohio 1898), aff'd, 95 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899), cert. denied, 176 U. S. 219 (1900);
Boston & M. R. R., 3 Op. Att. Gen. 199 (Mass. 1909).
85. Southern Ry. v. Lancaster. 149 Ga. 434, 100 S. E. 380 (1919); Ohio & Miss.
Ry. v. People, 123 Ill. 467, 14 N. E. 874 (1888); Attorney General v. Boston & M.
R. R., 109 Mass. 99 (1871).
86. Fisk v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 53 Barb. 513 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); Pollitz
v. Wabash R. R., 150 App. Div. 709, 135 N. Y. Supp. 785 (1st Dep't 1912).
87. Bachman v. Supreme Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor, 44 Ill. App. 188
(1892); Martinez v. Supreme Lodge of Knights, 81 Mo. App. 590 (1899), (1900) 13
HARv. L. REV. 597.
88. A survey of Moody's manuals has revealed no multiple corporations among the
industrial and public utility corporations and only 68 among the railroads.
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multiple corporations should be abolished by such a device as federal incor-
poration, especially since the solution for some of the problems may be
found in federal legislation of a less drastic type.
For instance, to alleviate one of the most serious problems faced by mul-
tiply incorporated railroads, namely the necessity of securing charter power
to issue securities from each charter state, Congress might exercise its
plenary power over interstate commerce to relieve the carriers from these
state restrictions.89 Although early decisions, influenced by Marshall's
restrictive theory of corporations, upheld the power of a state to condition
a gift of corporate power as it saw fit, even though the recipient was en-
gaged in interstate commerce, 0 subsequent Congressional legislation has
occasioned a substantial regression from this position. Thus, federal inter-
vention into the management of state corporations has been sustained on
the ground that Congress has the same power over instrumentalities of
interstate commerce that it would have if the corporation had been created
by act of Congress,91 and on this theory Congressional power to relieve
railroads from charter obligations burdening interstate commerce has been
upheld.9 2 Furthermore, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions might
be invoked to prevent the states from conditioning their grant of corporate
powers so as to thwart federal control over interstate commerce. 3
Even this type of legislation may, however, be unnecessary, since there is
considerable support for the view that Section 20a of the Transportation
Act,9 4 which grants to the Interstate Commerce Commission the right to
supervise the issuance of railroad securities, supplies a lack of corporate
powers. Although the Act, like most federal commerce legislation, does
not expressly negative continued state activity, the only affirmatively author-
89. A federal statute has been upheld as constitutional which conferred upon a
state corporation power which it lacked under its state charter. Sinking Fund Cases,
99 U. S. 700 (1878). But the congressional grant of new corporate powers was ap-
proved and confirmed by the state. Id. at 727-31.
90. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284 (U. S. 1873) (franchise
tax on gross receipts from interstate commerce); Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21
Wall. 456 (U. S. 1874) (state may regulate interstate rates if charter so provides);
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677 (1896) (state may prevent con-
solidation of interstate railroads).
91. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912).
92. New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 (1922); Colorado v. United States,
271 U. S. 153 (1926) ; Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522 (1934).
93. The doctrine has been applied in an ever-widening field. See Hale, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 CoL L Rsv. 3-1; Merrill, Un-
constitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 879. An analogy has been dravn
from this doctrine in limiting the Commission's authority to condition its approval of
re-organization plans. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 282 U. S. 311,
328 (1931).
94. 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U.S.C. 20a (1934).
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ized participation by the states in the regulation of securities is of a purely
advisory character. 95 And although the Act apparently does not preclude
the states from exacting the usual fees for charter amendments, 0 the only
limitation of state law actually binding on the Commission is that the securi-
ties be issued "for some lawful object within its corporate purposes."0 7
Since the Act speaks of corporate purposes and not powers, it would seem
that Commission approval of an issue of securities under Section 20a might
supply whatever powers are lacking under state charters to issue the securi-
ties in question.9" Indeed, a recent Supreme Court decision suggests that in
view of the expressed legislative intent to make the Commission's power
plenary, Congress did not intend to bind the Commission to follow limita-
tions imposed on corporate powers by state law.99
The Commission itself has neither accepted nor rejected this interpreta-
tion of the Section. Rather it has announced that it will follow state law
"without deciding to what extent our power with respect to an issue of
securities is affected by the limitation of a State regulation."' 100 Thus, the
Commission has been governed in the past by state laws prohibiting 'the
issuance of securities below par T10 and by other state regulations. 10 2 By this
policy the Commission seems to have emasculated its own powers. But it
may take little argument to convince the Commission that corporate powers
might be conferred on a carrier by an order issued under Section 20a, for
one commissioner seems to have been in sympathy with this view when, in
a dissenting opinion, he suggested that a carrier might apply directly to the
Commission for a grant of charter powers.
10 3
95. State authorities are authorized to make representations before the Commis-
sion for the protection of "the rights and interests of their people and the States."
41 STAT. 495 (1920), 49 U. S. C. 20a (b) (1934).
96. Chicago & E. I. Ry. v. Emmerson, 327 Ill. 574. 158 N. E. 857 (1927), cert.
denied, 277 U. S. 601 (1928).
97. 41 STAT. 495 (1920), 49 U. S. C. 20a (2) (1934).
98. See New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 122, 130
(S. D. N. Y. 1931); Public Service Comm. v. Northern Central Ry., 146 Md. 580,
592, 127 Atl. 112, 117 (1924); 2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMISSION
(1931) 249; cf. REYNOLDS, DISTRIBUTION OF POwER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE CARRIERS
BETWEEN THE NATION AND THE STATES (1928) 354, 368.
99. See New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 27
(1932) ; cf. Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522 (1934).
100. See Capital Stock of Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry., 82 I. C. C. 704, 706 (1923).
101. Capital Stock of Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry., 82 1. C. C. 704 (1923); Stock of
Castleman R. R., 90 T. C. C. 521 (1924).
102. Securities of St. Louis-S. F. Ry. and Certain Subsidiaries, 79 I. C. C. 323
(1923) ; Stock of Old Colony R. R., 124 I. C. C. 239 (1927); see LOCKLIN, REGULATION
OF SECURITY ISSUES (1927) c. 2; 2 SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 247-258. When
the carrier's corporate capacity to issue securities is in doubt, the Commission will
accept the opinion of the carrier's counsel. Assumption of Obligation and Liability by
New York Central R. R., 158 I. C. C. 317 (1929).




Existing legislation may be of further assistance in permitting railroads
to be consolidated by devices other than multiple incorporation. Prior to
1920, when state statutes either did not grant or expressly denied corporations
the power to carry out interstate unifications by sale, lease, or stock owner-
ship, unifications were often achieved by statutory consolidation between
corporations of two states which resulted in multiple incorporation. The
Transportation Act of 1920, however, gave the Commission authority to
approve unifications of railroads' 04 and relieved the carriers from all re-
straints and prohibitions of state or federal law in so far as was necessary
to perform an act approved by the Commission. 1°5 Under these provisions
it seems clear that Commission approval to lease or operate another rail-
road supersedes such state statutes as those prohibiting foreign railway
corporations from operating in the state' 0 0 or those prohibiting domestic
railways from leasing or selling their assets and franchise to foreign cor-
porations.107 If Commission approval obviates all difficulties where corporate
power is expressly negatived, it would clearly seem to do so where such
power is' merely lacking under charter provisions. A contrary view would
render unattainable one of the chief results which Congress sought, namely
the desire to confer upon the Commission complete control of consolidations
unhampered by state law.108 The Supreme Court has apparently leaned
toward this view, for it has said that Congress did not intend that the Com-
mission should determine whether the contemplated carrier action was within
its state charter power before issuing an order. 10 9 With state restrictions
removed and a lack of corporate power remedied, the carriers may achieve
unification by sale, lease, or stock ownership which do not result in multiple
incorporation.
But for corporations desiring to unify by statutory consolidation, federal
legislation has not been and probably will not be of much assistance in
preventing the emergence of multiple corporations. The Act of 1920 pro-
104. 41 STAT. 481 (1920), as amended, 48 STAT. 217 (1933), 49 U.S. C. § 5(4) (1934).
105. 41 STAT. 482 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (15) (1934).
106. Missouri Pac. R. R. Unification, 166 I. C. C. 154 (1930); Texarkana & T. S.
Ry. Control, 189 I. C. C. 253 (1932). The latter case %as affirmed by the Supreme
Court. but Texas did not contest the Commission's ruling that its statute as ineffective
to prevent foreign corporations from operating in the state. Texas v. United States,
292 U. S. 522 (1934).
107. Rock Island System Consolidation, 193 I. C. C. 395 (1933); see unreported
cases cited in Simpson. The Interstate Conmerce Commission and Railroad Consolida-
tion (1929) 43 HAnv. L. REv. 192, 241, n. 247.
108. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 8.13, and S. 844,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 53; Simpson, sutpra note 107, at 242; Comment (1931) 31
COL. L. RE%. 651. But see Quarles, Consolidation of Interstate Railroads (1933) 20 VA.
L. REv. 200.
109. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 275 U. S. 404 (192,) ; Claibire-
Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382 (1932); N. Y. Central Securities
Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932).
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